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Abstract 
 
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Environmental Protection Agency and other 
government agencies removed information from their websites that they feared could invite attacks on 
critical public and private infrastructure.  Accordingly, the benefits and costs of environmental 
information disclosure programs have come under increasing scrutiny.  This paper provides a framework 
for examining these benefits and costs, and illustrates the framework through three brief case studies of 
information disclosure programs:  risk management planning, materials accounting, and the Sector 
Facility Indexing Program.  The paper closes by using these three cases to outline what we know and still 
need to find out about information disclosure programs. 
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 The Benefits and Costs of Environmental Information 
Disclosure:  What Do We Know About Right-to-Know? 
Thomas C. Beierle∗ 
Introduction 
As fires still burned in the collapsed World Trade Center and the south wall of the 
Pentagon from the devastating air attacks of September 11, 2001, administrative agencies 
scrambled to remove data from their websites that could possibly provide information for 
terrorists.  At the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), staff made the decision to 
pull down information on chemical risk management plans, which included brief 
descriptions of the worst-case consequences of chemical accidents at industrial facilities 
around the country.  Such information, they feared, could provide targeting information 
for terrorists bent on using chemical plants as weapons of mass destruction. 
Agencies’ efforts to remove information from the Internet, and their extensive 
review of all information posted on their websites after September 11, have thrown into 
the spotlight the benefits and risks of broadly disclosing facility-specific environmental 
data. Debates about such risks and benefits are not new.  Indeed, concerns about terrorist 
attacks had significantly circumscribed the chemical risk management program long 
before September 11. 
Although the debates are not new, events are forcing into perspective questions 
about the appropriate line between the right to know and the need to keep secret.  More 
than ever before, agencies will be forced to seek a balance between the legitimate societal 
risks and benefits of disclosure programs.  However, there is little systematic 
understanding of where to draw this line because of incomplete knowledge of what 
disclosure’s benefits are, what threats it may pose, and how different approaches to 
program design affect the benefit–cost calculus.  This paper seeks to clarify these issues 
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and identify what we know and what we still need to find out about information 
disclosure. 
The approach taken here is somewhat unusual in the literature on environmental 
information disclosure in that the analysis does not focus on the Toxics Release Inventory 
(TRI).  The most recognized and copied information disclosure program in environmental 
management, TRI was established by Congress after a devastating chemical accident at a 
Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India in 1984.  Originally intended to improve 
understanding of potential risks from industrial facilities, TRI surprised many by 
revealing that the releases it profiled were declining dramatically each year—by a total of  
46% in the first 11 years of the program.  It appeared that exposing information about 
releases could cause firms to reduce them.  EPA came to call TRI “one of the most 
effective environmental programs ever legislated by Congress and administered by EPA” 
(Graham and Miller 2001). 
TRI launched EPA to the forefront of efforts to use information provision as a 
regulatory tool and established the paradigm for information disclosure programs that 
followed.  This paper focuses on the most prominent among these post-TRI efforts:  risk 
management planning (RMP), which would provide detailed information on chemical 
accident risks and prevention; materials accounting (also known as chemical use 
reporting), which would provide information on how chemicals traveled through 
processes at industrial facilities; and the Sector Facility Indexing Project (SFIP), which 
would consolidate enforcement, compliance, and other data into a package of 
environmental performance indicators. 
These post-TRI programs are ideal for examining the benefits and costs of 
information disclosure because the issues were so clearly exposed in political debates.  In 
contrast to TRI, which was passed with a very low profile and quite low expectations, 
stakeholders debating RMP, materials accounting, and SFIP had a clear picture—gleaned 
mainly from their experience with TRI—of what potential benefits or risks information 
disclosure posed for their interests.  The trade-offs arrived at by the political process also 
offer an opportunity to evaluate options for balancing benefits and costs. 
Section 1 contains a general framework for describing the benefits and costs of 
information disclosure.  Benefits are organized into normative, substantive, and 
instrumental categories that reflect the many overlapping visions and rationales advanced 
by supporters of disclosure.  The discussion of costs focuses on arguments that arose Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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most frequently in political debates about information disclosure: direct costs to firms, 
misplaced public priorities, and the unintended use of disclosed data. 
Section 2 contains brief case studies of the three information disclosure programs, 
highlighting arguments about benefits and costs and outlining the impact of policy 
decisions meant to strike a balance.  Drawing on the cases, Section 3 describes what we 
know and what we don’t know about information disclosure.  In cases where we don’t 
know what we should, it outlines important future research questions and approaches. 
The paper’s conclusion provides insights into the future of information disclosure, 
arguing for a focus on environmental goals and the conscious crafting of information 
policies to achieve them.  This final section points out issues to keep in mind in crafting 
such policies, drawing on the theoretical framework and the lessons from the case 
studies.  
1. The Benefits and Costs of Information Disclosure 
The literature on public participation suggests a structure for examining the 
benefits of information disclosure.  Analysts typically cite three types of rationales for 
public involvement: normative, instrumental, and substantive (Fiorino 1990, Perhac 
1996).  Each defines a category of potential benefits. 
The principal normative rationale for information disclosure is summed up in the 
term “right to know.”  Namely, these policies recognize an individual’s right to self-
protection and therefore the community’s right to information about the risks residents 
face.  Until large reductions in emissions became apparent, EPA regarded TRI primarily 
as a right-to-know program that was outside of the agency’s core mission of setting and 
enforcing emissions standards (Graham 2002). 
Substantive rationales for information disclosure argue that such programs 
produce data that lead to new insights and understanding of environmental problems and 
how to remedy them.  As Graham (2002) says of TRI: “Disclosure derived its power … 
from the simple fact that numbers were added up for the first time and linked to identified 
sources.”  Internal to the firm, the process of collecting information may reveal 
unrecognized opportunities for improving environmental performance, one reason that 
some programs require top management to sign off on disclosure reports.  Information 
shared with government agencies can allow regulators to better tailor their programs.  For 
example, EPA’s air office used TRI to help strengthen the air toxics component of the 
Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990, cross-check emissions data from industry, Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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allocate monies to states for implementation of CAAA, and develop regulatory standards 
for air toxics (the maximum achievable control technologies or MACT standards), among 
other things (Greenwood and Sachdev 1999).  Information shared with the public can 
support more informed problem-solving when facilities, government, and the public sit 
down to work out problems. 
Instrumental rationales argue that disclosure improves environmental 
performance.  No information disclosure program is simply about the normative appeal 
of providing neighbors with risk information or the substantive appeal of generating 
useful data.  All programs are intended to force change in some manner or another, be it 
reduced emissions, increased accident safety, pollution prevention, better regulatory 
compliance, or some other goal.  TRI’s much-lauded instrumental benefit, for example, is 
the 46% reduction in toxic releases in 11 years.   
In the conceptual model of information disclosure, instrumental benefits—defined 
here in terms of firm-level environmental performance—generally derive from normative 
and substantive benefits.  Analysts describe the linkage as a “shock and shame” dynamic 
by which new, comprehensive risk information shocks citizens, the media, agencies, and 
markets into driving change externally and shames companies themselves to drive change 
from within (Stephan 2002).  It is important to note, however, that normative and 
substantive benefits can be important in and of themselves, even if they don’t lead 
directly to improvements in facility environmental performance.  Greater community 
awareness of risks may lead neighbors to plan more effectively for accidents or mitigate 
their exposure—both obvious benefits from a public health perspective—even if it 
doesn’t cause a facility to reduce emissions.  Better information on environmental 
problems may help agencies make better use of limited resources or allow them to 
evaluate and improve traditional regulatory programs.  In the short term at least, the gains 
may be in bureaucratic efficiency, not in environmental quality. 
Three costs of information disclosure comprise the other side of the ledger.  First 
is the cost of information collection and reporting.  In debates over TRI, industry used 
such arguments to win the right to estimate TRI releases rather than monitor emissions 
directly (Graham 2002).  Other than small business exemptions, concerns about these 
direct costs have subsided for TRI (Wolf 1996), but they have reappeared in other 
information disclosure debates. 
Second is the unpredictability and loss of control involved in having the public, 
rather than government managers, determine what facilities should do.  In the information Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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disclosure paradigm, according to Fung and O’Rourke (2000), “environmental 
‘standards’ are not determined by expert analysis of acceptable risk, but are effectively 
set at the levels informed citizens will accept.”  Some charge that, with information 
disclosure programs, EPA is abdicating its authority to pursue rational goals, instead 
leaving policy up to an unknowing and irrational public (Gray 2000).  Integral to such 
criticisms is a fear that the public will be misled by incomplete, biased, or inaccurate 
information and will react based on perceptions of risk rather than “real” risk (Gowda and 
Fox 1998). 
The third type of cost is unintended use of information.  Disclosure on the 
Internet, in particular, creates vast new opportunities for communication, but it also 
makes information access geographically boundless and anonymous.  Most salient since 
September 11 is the fear that disclosed information may be used by terrorists.  Other 
concerns have arisen as well, including fears of corporate spying. 
The nature of the benefits and costs in any particular program depends on the type 
of disclosure that occurs.  To simplify, policymakers contemplating information 
disclosure policies can choose from among four levels of information sharing.   
First is full disclosure following the TRI approach, in which there is a free 
exchange of information among firms, government, local communities, interest groups, 
the media, and anyone else who may be interested.  All modern models of disclosure 
involve the Internet.   Unlike previous approaches to disclosure—such as availability of 
information through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)—the Internet provides un-
intermediated public access, easy linkages with other databases and contextual 
information, and geographic presentation of data.  Any desktop computer now provides 
information that used to be accessible only in dusty basement rooms in Washington, DC.  
Of course, Internet availability provides access to those who may use it in unwanted 
ways, be they business competitors seeking confidential information, terrorists looking 
for vulnerabilities, or others. 
Short of the full disclosure model, information can be shared locally with 
surrounding communities or, in a more general sense, only to those directly at risk.  
Using a variety of approaches, such as community advisory committees, proactive 
communication, facility tours, and the like, firms communicate with neighbors to bolster 
community trust and confidence in facility operations.  For example, in 1988 the 
Chemical Manufacturers Association adopted its Responsible Care program, which, 
among other things, committed companies to a “good neighbor” arrangement involving Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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disclosure as a basis for “openness and community dialogue” (Erekson and Johnson 
1999). 
Information sharing can be circumscribed even further and shared only with 
regulatory agencies.  This is the traditional regulatory relationship of compliance 
reporting bolstered by periodic inspections and enforcement.  Most such information is, 
strictly speaking, available to the public through FOIA.  In practice, however, it is 
difficult to obtain, compile, and use, except by specialists.  Exemptions to FOIA, 
particularly since September 11, are increasingly being discussed for issues such as 
corporate environmental audits and voluntary disclosure of possible weaknesses in 
critical infrastructure.  Without disclosure requirements, the argument goes, business will 
be more likely to share information with government. 
Finally, information can be held within firms and not disclosed at all.  Firms 
routinely generate environmental information for their own use, and some policies 
encourage or require firms to do so.  For example, some states require that firms employ 
Environmental Management Systems (EMS) as a condition of qualifying for more 
flexible environmental permitting programs (Davies 2001).  Producing proprietary 
information as part of an EMS may encourage firms to find opportunities, ideally cost-
saving or otherwise innovative ones, for voluntarily improving environmental 
performance. Such information, however, rarely makes it past the facility fence line.  The 
most widely used EMS standard is the international ISO 14001, and it involves no 
requirement for public disclosure (Coglianese and Nash 2001). 
The design of all information disclosure programs revolves around which of these 
four levels of information sharing is the correct one for the type of data produced.  What 
types of data should firms be required to collect but not necessarily share?  What data 
should be reported to agencies or to local communities?  What data should agencies post 
on the Internet?  Answering these questions should involve balancing the costs and 
benefits of disclosure.   
Table 1 summarizes issues raised about the benefit-cost calculus when 
information sharing moves from one level to another.  Concerning normative benefits, 
there is now a widespread political consensus, even among industries, that local 
communities should have information about operations that put them at risk.  There are 
remaining questions, however, about what constitutes adequate information about risk.  
Additionally, there is debate about whether a normative basis exists for placing risk Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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information on the Internet and making it available to all communities, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), the media, and others not put at direct risk. 
Substantive benefits may arise at any level of information sharing.  Two questions 
remain, however, about the importance of newly generated data.  First is how useful data 
is to firms themselves, and whether new planning and reporting requirements reveal new 
opportunities for environmental improvement. Second is the extent to which 
information—whether provided locally or over the Internet—is an important trigger for 
encouraging dialogue between communities and local firms, as suggested by information 
disclosure proponents. 
Like substantive benefits, instrumental benefits can accrue at any level of 
information sharing, but moving up through the levels increases the number of parties 
who can apply pressure on firms.  Of critical importance is knowing the effectiveness of 
pressure at each level.   When is voluntary action by firms sufficient?  Can local 
communities apply pressure without the involvement of intermediaries? 
Like benefits, issues of costs change from level to level.  Changing least are the 
direct costs of information collection and reporting, which accrue even if information is 
never shared beyond a regulatory agency.  However, costs driven by public reaction to 
disclosed information have the potential to increase substantially as information is shared 
ever more broadly.  Poor quality and fragmentary data, as well as tendencies in public 
risk perception, create opportunities for public over- or under-reaction. These reactions 
are highly dependent on who information intermediaries are and how they craft their 
messages.  What is not known is the extent to which anxieties about public reaction are 
supported by actual experience. 
Costs of unintended use of data also increase as information is shared more 
broadly.  Concerns about protection of confidential business information are largely 
tractable, while issues raised by the threat of terrorism are not yet well-understood. Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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Table 1:  Benefit and Cost Considerations for Different Approaches to Information Sharing 
  Firm Only  Firm-Government  Community Disclosure  Full Disclosure 
 
BENEFITS 
Normative: Fulfilling a 
“Right to Know” 
Not applicable  Not applicable  Right to know generally 
accepted for local 
communities 
Right to know not necessarily 
accepted for NGOs, media, and 
others 













NGOs and media agenda 














Costs of Collection and 
Reporting 
Collection costs only  Collection and reporting 
costs 
Collection and reporting 
costs 
Collection and reporting costs 
Risk of Misplaced 
Priorities 
Not applicable  Not applicable  Firms control message and 
process 
Competition over message from 
many sources 
Risk of Unwanted Use 
 
Not applicable  Not applicable  Use can largely be 
controlled 
Geographic reach and 
anonymity limit ability to 
control use  
9 
2. Three Case Studies of Information Disclosure 
EPA’s success with TRI spawned a number of disclosure initiatives, and the three most 
prominent are discussed here in order to illustrate the benefits and costs of actual programs.  The 
risk management program called on facilities to plan for and disclose information about risks of 
chemical accidents and steps taken to prevent and mitigate them.  The materials accounting 
initiative sought to move TRI “inside the fence line” to allow the public to track how chemicals 
were actually being used at facilities.  Finally, the Sector Facility Indexing Project sought to 
disclose information on facility compliance. 
Risk Management Plans  
The RMP program was intended to prevent unintentional chemical releases to the 
environment from industrial accidents.  Section 112(r) of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments 
required that facilities using threshold amounts of certain flammable and toxic substances 
develop a risk management program and submit a summary of it (the RMP) to EPA and other 
entities.  Due by June 1999, the RMPs were to describe the possibility of chemical accidents and 
plans for preventing and responding to them.   
An aspect of the legislation requiring that facilities develop “worst-case” chemical 
accident scenarios, called Offsite Consequence Analyses (OCA), and make them publicly 
available triggered the program’s greatest controversy.  The OCAs described the geographic 
extent of harms to surrounding populations from catastrophic chemical accidents.  The modeled 
plumes of airborne hazardous chemicals in some cases extended over populations of a million 
people or more. 
EPA and other disclosure proponents used normative, substantive, and instrumental 
rationales to justify Internet distribution of RMP information, including the OCAs.  Most salient 
was the normative rationale—that local communities had a right to know about releases that 
could put them in danger.  Substantive rationales suggested both the benefits to firms of 
improving their internal risk management practices and the external benefits of allowing a more 
informed public to engage in “a dialogue with industry to reduce risk” (EPA 1996).  Supporters 
pointed to an instrumental rationale as well, arguing that public access to RMP data would 
reduce death and injury from accidents by driving facilities to better prevent and control 
accidental releases and, ideally, switch to inherently safer technologies.  Supporters were buoyed Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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by a similar New Jersey law that encouraged 80% of water treatment facilities in the state to 
eliminate hazardous chlorine gas or reduce their use of it below threshold levels (Shinn 2001).   
EPA quickly became embroiled in a controversy about the possible utility of OCAs for 
terrorists. Over the course of four years, disagreements between industry and environmentalists 
on EPA’s stakeholder advisory committee spread to interagency fights among EPA, the FBI, and 
other security agencies.   Sensitized by the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and the 1998 
embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, opponents worried that the compilation of 
information, and the ability to access it from anywhere in the world easily and anonymously, 
would make OCAs a roadmap for terrorists.  Ultimately, Congress settled the debate between 
opponents and proponents of disclosure in 1999 with highly prescriptive legislation implemented 
through rules developed jointly by EPA and the Department of Justice (EPA and DOJ 2000). 
The final outline of the program shifted RMP from a full-blown information disclosure 
model to one focused only on local communities.  Although much of the less controversial RMP 
information would still be broadly available on the Internet, the OCAs would only be available 
locally. After showing identification, community members could read, but not remove or copy, a 
limited number of paper versions of OCAs in approximately 50 federal reading rooms around the 
country and at state and local emergency planning agencies.  Firms were required to conduct 
public meetings to explain the RMPs, including OCAs, to local communities. 
The decision to pull OCA data off of the Internet and make it available only locally 
significantly limited the normative right-to-know benefits of the program.  To a great extent, the 
program’s final architecture severed the communication channels running from advocacy groups 
and the media to local communities.  EPA and local emergency planning committees (LEPCs) 
did not play much of a liaison role to local communities either.  Indeed, most LEPCs reported 
having no requests for RMP information from citizens (Starik et al 2000, NICS 2001).  Although 
there were certainly some local public meetings held by firms that could be characterized as 
“dialogues with industry to reduce risk,” they appear not to have been the norm (Erekson and 
Johnson 1999, NICS 2001, EPA and DOJ 2000). 
The principal substantive benefits of the program were limited to facilities themselves, 
involving whatever they learned about their own accident prevention and other risk management 
efforts through RMP planning.  EPA has done little with the information collected beyond a few 
efforts to report compiled data (Belke 2000, Kleindorfer et al. 2000).   
For many firms, particularly those with poorly attended public meetings, the only 
significant source of pressure for facility-level changes was self-imposed.  Although information Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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on accident rates is too poor to document the impact of RMPs, there is some evidence that the 
program is driving some firms toward inherently safer technologies, which are less prone to 
accidental or catastrophic releases (Ashford et al. 1993).  In the water treatment sector, for 
example, improving inherent safety often involves switching from elemental chlorine, which can 
be released as a toxic gas, to sodium hypochlorite. According to data from the American Water 
Works Association, there has been a decline in chlorine gas use: 91% of facilities used chlorine 
gas in 1978, 87% in 1989, and 84% in 1998.  At the same time, use of sodium hypochlorite has 
risen from 6% in 1978 to 7% in 1989, and then to 20% in 1998. (The combined number of 
facilities using chlorine gas and sodium hypochlorite in 1998 exceeds 100% because some 
facilities use more than one disinfectant.)  Many suggest that these changes in treatment 
technologies are due to companies seeking to avoid reporting under the RMP program altogether 
(Belke 2002, Leason and Mathews 2000).  What is not known is whether more public disclosure 
of OCAs would have driven such trends more strongly.  After September 11, a number of 
continuing chemical safety vulnerabilities at industrial sites were revealed.  
Materials Accounting  
As the large amount of emissions reductions attributed to TRI became clear, EPA 
considered ways to expand the program.  Taking its lead from programs in Massachusetts and 
New Jersey, the agency resurrected an aspect of TRI dropped in the compromise version of the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA).  It would take TRI “inside 
the fence line” by requiring facilities to track what chemicals were coming into a facility, how 
they were being transformed into waste and products, and what was coming out of facilities at 
the end. 
As in the case of RMPs, EPA’s vision for disclosing materials accounting data covered 
normative, substantive, and instrumental rationales.  EPA posited a normative right-to-know 
argument, stating, “exposure is the key to risk, and use is an important surrogate for exposure” 
(EPA 1994).  More central to EPA’s vision of materials accounting were the program’s 
substantive benefits.  These covered information revealed to firms themselves and information 
revealed to communities that could bring “pollution prevention into the mainstream of 
environmental dialogue at the community level” (EPA 1995).  The program was also seen as 
promoting the instrumental goal of pollution prevention by creating incentives to move 
reductions in pollution upstream from “end-of-the-pipe” controls. Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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Industry opponents saw the potential benefit of tracking materials accounting information 
for firms’ own use.  What vexed them, however, was that EPA had not adequately justified the 
benefits of releasing materials accounting data to the public.  Industry argued that to generate 
data of such dubious public utility would be very expensive, and it risked revealing confidential 
business information.  The proliferation of data on the Internet, industry argued, would allow 
competitors to piece together disparate data elements to form a revealing “mosaic” of facility 
operations. 
EPA developed its outline of a proposed chemical use reporting program in 1993 and got 
a boost for the program in 1995, when the White House called for “an expedited, open, and 
transparent process for” pursuing it (Clinton 1995).  EPA developed its vision through an 
iterative process of issues papers and public comments, and issued an Advanced Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking in 1996 (EPA 1996b).   External stakeholders provided 40,000 comments 
on the plan.  The volume of comments, the vehemence of the opposition to the program, 
Congressional involvement, other priorities, and increasing questions about EPA’s statutory 
authority for the program led to ever-longer delays in the project.  Ultimately, EPA decided to 
discontinue its pursuit of the program in mid-1998. 
To judge the extent to which materials accounting at EPA would have produced some of 
its hoped-for benefits, it is necessary to analogize it to the experiences in Massachusetts and New 
Jersey.  It is important to note that materials accounting disclosure in both states was 
accompanied by extensive pollution prevention planning.  Much of the information generated in 
the planning process was kept within the firm or shared only with government.  Only summary 
data was publicly disclosed. 
Little is known about the normative right-to-know benefits from state materials 
accounting disclosure.  However, until recently, it has been difficult for the general public to 
access the data in Massachusetts, and it remains difficult in the New Jersey program. 
 
The Massachusetts and New Jersey programs can point to more prominent substantive 
and instrumental achievements.  Compiling the materials accounting data and undergoing the 
pollution prevention planning processes revealed opportunities for improving environmental 
performance. Many firms saw, for the first time, data on the volumes of chemicals flowing 
through their processes and how chemicals were transformed into products and waste.  Such 
revelations may well be responsible for many of the early instrumental benefits of the program, 
in which both states exceeded the national norm in reducing emissions and waste generation.  Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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Interestingly, Much of this reduction in releases and waste in both states occurred before 
information was analyzed and made broadly available to the public, primarily through NGO 
reports. 
Sector Facility Indexing Project  
Developed by EPA’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA), SFIP 
discloses compliance records of regulated facilities, emissions and spill records, and information 
on production capacity and surrounding demographics.  The original plan for SFIP called for it 
also to include a “risk indicator,” which would characterize toxic releases in terms of their 
relative toxicity.  Launched in 1998, it covered around 625 facilities in five industrial sectors:  
pulp manufacturing, petroleum refining, automobile assembly, iron and steel manufacturing, and 
primary smelting and refining of nonferrous metals.  Federal facilities have since been added and 
a related program covering vastly more facilities was launched in late 2002. 
EPA offered multiple and overlapping rationales for the SFIP program (EPA 1997).  By 
tying facility noncompliance to risk information, it would provide normative right-to-know 
benefits. EPA saw substantive benefits in using an integrated, cross-sectoral database to target its 
compliance and enforcement efforts.  Environmentalists would be able to focus on facilities and 
states with poor records of compliance and enforcement, and citizens would be more informed 
participants in decisionmaking with government and with industry.  The principal instrumental 
benefit envisioned by SFIP was to improve facility performance, implicitly defined as improved 
compliance, reduced local risks from spills and TRI emissions, and less pollution per unit of 
production. 
While EPA and environmentalists saw a program that could accomplish many goals, 
industry saw an unfocused program with a number of potential costs (EPA 1997).  Industry 
found an unlikely ally in state environmental agencies, which worried about new resource 
burdens and the potential that enforcement data would put their programs in a poor light.  States 
and industry argued that SFIP provided misleading and inaccurate data that would create a public 
relations nightmare and cause them to waste money on problems of little real concern.  Much of 
the data in SFIP, they argued, was simply incorrect.  Industry and the states leveled particularly 
intense criticism at the risk indicator, claiming that it was not based on sound science.   
OECA announced that it would initiate SFIP as a pilot project in 1995 and quickly found 
itself embroiled in a major effort to quality assure the data.  For the next three years, states, 
individual facilities, and EPA reviewed and corrected data, and EPA faced various legal and Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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political challenges to the program.  Along the way, the agency’s principal concession was to 
drop the risk indicator.  EPA launched the site in 1998, while the agency was still in the midst of 
a great deal of opposition to the program. 
SFIP’s ability to produce information disclosure benefits has been mixed.  The absence of 
the risk indicator was a considerable blow to its normative right-to-know justification, although 
compliance and other data in SFIP have their own right-to-know value.  The expected (or feared) 
public reaction to SFIP data has not occurred, and many point to a lack of public awareness 
about the program.  In discussion sessions held for a 1999 evaluation of the program, industries 
and states said they had not been contacted by citizens regarding SFIP information.  Much of the 
use of the agency’s website appears not to come from facility neighbors surfing for information 
on local risks, but from a dedicated set of frequent users, many probably in industry checking on 
the accuracy of EPA’s data for their facility.  In fact, SFIP is extremely hard for the casual 
browser to find on EPA’s website. 
Substantive benefits have been more prominent. EPA enforcement staff use SFIP for a 
variety of purposes, mainly because it is more user-friendly than other data systems at the 
agency.  NGOs have used SFIP to highlight compliance problems and to lobby state and federal 
governments (Coequyt et al. 1999; Coequyt et al. 2000).   
It is difficult to argue that SFIP has produced much in the way of instrumental benefits, 
however.  A comparison of compliance rates from the early months of the program to the most 
recent periods reveals that, while compliance has improved for some sectors in some areas, it has 
stayed the same or worsened in more (Beierle 2002).  Interestingly, compliance has not 
obviously improved in even those areas highlighted by NGO lobbying efforts.  For most of the 
sectors profiled by SFIP, reductions in TRI releases have not exceeded the national trend either. 
3.  What do We Know About Right-to-Know? 
The RMP program, materials accounting, and SFIP reflect a variety of disclosure models. 
They range from proprietary materials accounting planning at the firm level, to a community 
disclosure arrangement for the RMP program, and full disclosure for SFIP.  All of the programs 
have interesting patterns of success across the normative, substantive, and instrumental arenas of 
benefits, and they provide insights into the various costs of these programs.  Below, the three 
cases are used to elucidate what we know about information disclosure after TRI as well as what 
we still need to find out. Resources for the Future  Beierle 
15 
Normative Benefits:  A Right to Know About Risks  
In the political debates about information dissemination policies, there is relative 
consensus on all sides that local communities have a right to know about the risks they face.  
Even in the heated fights over risk management plans, industry frequently championed local 
communities’ right to know.  Important questions remain, however, about the 
comprehensiveness of risk information provided and the role that intermediaries play in 
educating local communities about risks. 
A technical understanding of risk involves identifying a number of elements, including a 
hazard’s source, the probability of release, the number of people exposed to the release, the dose 
they receive, and the toxicity of the hazardous substance.  The information disclosure programs 
profiled here generally provided only one or two of these elements of risk, and even then only 
imperfectly. 
Interestingly, the two items that generated the most controversy and were never broadly 
disclosed—OCAs in the risk management program and the risk indicator in the SFIP program—
provided the most information approximating a risk paradigm.  The demise of these elements of 
disclosure, along with controversies surrounding other EPA efforts to provide more sophisticated 
pictures of risk, suggests strongly that there are political limits to how much risk characterization 
EPA can actually provide. 
 Beyond the issue of what constitutes adequate information about risk is how such 
information is communicated to local communities.  Specifically, is there a normative argument 
for disseminating risk information to those not directly put at risk?  The strongest such argument 
relates to the role played by interest groups and the media as information intermediaries (Lynn 
and Kartez 1994).   Local communities may never know about local risks without the 
intervention of advocacy groups and the media.  The RMP program is the strongest case in point.  
Restricting access via the Internet and allowing only paper-based local distribution of OCA data 
largely cut out—by intent or neglect— all intermediaries except companies themselves.  If 
communities have a right to know about risk information, then intermediaries need to be able to 
bring that information to them. 
There is still much we don’t know, however, about the general public’s knowledge about 
risks and the utility of information disclosure to increase that knowledge. How much more do 
local communities know about risks because of information disclosure?  Where do they get their 
information?  Who uses the information?   The greatest research need for answering these 
questions is for surveys of local communities.   Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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Substantive Benefits:  Who Uses the Data and How? 
Across all of the cases, the substantive benefits of generating and combining data in new 
ways was obvious at each level of information sharing.  Companies learned more about 
themselves, agencies used data to tailor their programs, and NGOs identified lobbying priorities.  
Materials accounting revealed gaps in TRI reporting, and the compilation of SFIP sectors 
revealed a number of problems with EPA’s approach to facility identification.  The list of 
substantive benefits could go on.  Even if all of this information has had no effect on 
environmental quality, we can confidently say that it has helped usher in a more information-rich 
environment in which to make decisions.  Two critical issues about the utility of new data to 
particular actors, however, remain. 
First is the extent to which useful information is revealed to firms when government 
mandates data collection. Karkkainen (2001) argues that TRI succeeded, in part, by giving firm 
managers a new and consistent metric for understanding and tracking pollution performance.  
There is some evidence from the three case studies to support Karkkainen’s view. The best 
evidence comes from the materials accounting experiences in Massachusetts and New Jersey.  
Seventy percent of 434 firms responding to a survey said the process of developing toxic use 
reduction plans led them to identify toxic use reduction opportunities (81% said they already had 
implemented, or would implement, at least a few of the projects identified in their plans) (Becker 
and Geiser 1997).  In the RMP program, there is anecdotal evidence that at least some companies 
made operational changes based on data generated in developing their RMPs.  And, one 
argument about why SFIP has not been effective is that it requires no new firm-level data 
generation and therefore reveals nothing new for managers to act on. 
The second important question about the substantive benefits of information disclosure is 
the extent to which information empowers local communities.  EPA saw the RMP program as a 
way to help the public engage in “a dialogue with industry to reduce risk” (EPA 1996) and 
materials accounting was a way to bring “pollution prevention into the mainstream of 
environmental dialogue at the community level” (EPA 1995).  However, increased information 
will do little to enhance the community role in environmental dialogues with firms if the broader 
mechanisms for public participation are not working well.  The primary formal method by which 
local communities influence firms’ behavior is through permitting.  Here, however, public 
participation is hampered by what Davies (2001) calls “the complexity and relative invisibility of 
the … process.”  Local groups don’t have the resources to track the highly convoluted and Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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technical process, and none of the information disclosure programs profiled here provide much 
assistance. 
Of course, local communities may confront industries outside of formal processes, taking 
direct or political action.  Here again, however, the barriers to action are often organizational 
rather than informational.  Local communities—even if they know about risks—have only 
limited ability to do much about them on their own.  To be effective, they need to join with 
larger networks of state and federal advocacy groups—to essentially move away from 
“environmental dialogue at the community level” to state and national efforts. 
Information, in and of itself, may be a necessary condition of local involvement, but it is 
clearly not sufficient.  The role for research is to tease out just how necessary it is.  By what 
channels can local communities affect firms’ behavior?  How important is disclosed information 
in enhancing those channels?  What kind of information is most useful? 
Instrumental Benefits:  Are They Real? 
Each of the three programs had instrumental goals aimed at environmental improvement.  
Although information is sparse, the RMP program appears to have helped drive some switches to 
safer technologies.  How much more apparent such changes would be if information were more 
broadly disclosed we do not know.  State-level materials accounting also appears to be linked to 
greater environmental performance.  However, many more forces than public disclosure appear 
to be in play.  SFIP has seemingly had little effect on compliance rates or TRI releases for the 
sectors covered despite broad disclosure. 
Conclusions about the instrumental benefits of information disclosure in the three cases 
are only preliminary.  More research is needed to tease out the impacts of information disclosure 
from all of the other forces in play.  Analyses will have to control for economic changes, changes 
in production, industry composition, other regulatory programs, and a variety of other exogenous 
factors.  For some programs, such as RMP and SFIP, it may be necessary to allow more time for 
instrumental results to become evident. 
Cost of Collecting and Reporting Information 
All information disclosure policies—whether information is kept within the firm or 
distributed on the Internet—involve costs of collection, and most involve some costs of 
reporting. Studies suggest that these costs vary from program to program and facility to facility, Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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but they also suggest that some stakeholders dramatically overestimated costs in political 
debates.   
In the EPA materials accounting debate, industry charged that data collection costs would 
be very high. The Chemical Specialties Manufacturing Association reported that one company in 
Massachusetts spent 150 hours of staff time reporting on one chemical and the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association estimated costs for a large chemical manufacturer at around $1.5 
million for the first year and $800,000 after that (EPA 1995).  However, a 1993 New Jersey 
Department of Environmental Protection study of 14 facilities found much lower costs, and a 
follow-up 1995 study confirmed the lower numbers. (NJDEP 1995, EPA 1995).  In 
Massachusetts and New Jersey, direct reporting costs averaged around $10,000 for initial 
planning efforts and $3,000 for the first year of reporting (Currier and Van Atten 1997; Kerr, 
Greiner, Anderson and April, Inc 2000).  These costs translate into 124 person hours for plan 
preparation and 41 hours for annual reporting, which is similar to the 50 person hours required 
for annual TRI reporting (Graham 2002).   
Costs for the RMP program appear to have been quite a bit higher than for materials 
accounting, however.  Interviews with 10 companies found that compiling the RMP data took 
from 200 hours for small companies to 3,000 hours for large ones (Kleindorfer et al. 2000). 
Assuming a similar person-hour rate for RMPs as materials accounting, the large companies may 
have spent around $235,000 on RMP planning. 
Regardless of the cost of generating and reporting information, it is the one topic in this 
paper where the issue of whether information is fully disclosed (e.g., on the Internet) or not 
matters only indirectly.  The greatest cost of these programs is in planning and data collection, 
costs that would be incurred even if government only mandated firms to generate the information 
for proprietary purposes.  Additional reporting costs kick in if facilities have to report to 
agencies.  However, moving information dissemination out to a community disclosure 
arrangement or onto the Internet adds little to direct costs. 
Basic research is still needed on the data collection and reporting costs across programs 
in order to identify the factors that contribute to higher costs and why costs differ across 
programs and facilities.  Also needed are creative approaches to streamlined planning and 
reporting, particularly those that make better use of information technology. Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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Cost of Dealing With Public Reaction 
A conflict at the core of information disclosure is the desireability of bottom-up 
environmental priorities driven by local values and perceptions or top-down environmental 
priorities driven by expert analysis.  The conflict is exacerbated if the public reaction is thought 
to be driven by poor-quality or misleading information.  
Most easily dealt with is the issue of data quality.  Many information disclosure laws 
require companies to produce the information that will be disclosed.  TRI data, RMP plans, and 
materials accounting information all originate with firms, and it is in firms’ best interest to 
produce accurate data.  One program, SFIP, disclosed compliance and enforcement information 
generated by agencies, and it aroused the greatest controversy over data quality.  Even the SFIP 
data, however, proved to be largely accurate.  An intensive review by facilities revealed that only 
about 10% of records needed correcting.  SFIP also spurred the agency to introduce a data 
collection procedure that is now the model for such processes throughout the agency.  Data 
quality is largely a tractable problem, and methods for resolving such problems are being 
implemented. 
A more difficult issue is data that causes the public to misinterpret risks and their origins. 
As previously discussed, information disclosure programs generally provide only a few pieces of 
the risk assessment puzzle, a fact for which agencies, environmentalists, and industry all have to 
take some blame.  Fragmentary information, in combination with common patterns of public risk 
perception, may lead the public to react more or less strongly to risk information than would be 
supported by a technical assessment of risk (Slovic 1992).   
While public misunderstanding of information may be an argument for more restricted 
information sharing, it can also constitute an argument for broader sharing.  Fragmentary risk 
information is useful to groups on all sides of environmental debates willing to portray risks to 
local communities in a way that suits their ends.  This intermediation creates a difference 
between information sharing models.  In a community disclosure arrangement, the local public 
hears only from firms, giving the sources of risk considerable ability to control the messages 
citizens receive about those risks.  With full disclosure, there are many competing voices, and 
NGOs, the media, and companies have to vie for the attention and trust of local communities. 
Although fragmentary information, risk perception issues, and manipulation of 
information by intermediaries create ample room for public over-reaction to risk information, 
there is actually little evidence that it is a widespread problem in practice.  Indeed, when looking 
across the three programs detailed here, one is tempted to ask, “Where is the angry public?”  Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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There has been little local demand for RMPs.  Evaluations of the Massachusetts and New Jersey 
materials accounting programs conclude that there has been very little use of the data by the 
general public (Kerr, Greiner, Anderson and April, Inc. 2000).  In the evaluation of the SFIP 
program, states and companies admitted that, far from their initial fear of a deluge of concerned 
calls, they had received little interest.  Ironically, some state participants thought, “the public 
may not be sufficiently aware of SFIP to derive its full benefit” (EPA 1999). 
The apparent lack of public reaction diminishes claims on both sides of information 
disclosure debates.  For opponents, it suggests that fears of money and effort spent on misplaced 
priorities are overblown.  For proponents, it suggests that information disclosure is far less than a 
revolutionary alternative to top-down command and control.  However, there is much we still 
don’t know.  More research is needed on risk perception and actual cases of decisionmaking.  
How do people interpret disclosed information and perceive related risks?  What do people do 
once they have identified a perceived risk, and how do these subsequent activities clarify their 
understanding of that risk?  What do existing case studies reveal about the role of inaccurate or 
misleading disclosed data? 
Cost of Unintended Use of Data   
Two primary fears of unwanted use of data dominated the case studies: corporate spying 
and terrorism.  Both fears were triggered by information sharing on the Internet: what was once 
only local had become global, and those with access to the information had become anonymous.  
Other, more circumscribed models of information sharing did not trigger significant concerns 
about corporate spying or terrorism. 
Fears of corporate spying loomed largest in the debates over materials accounting data.  
Information on the types and amounts of chemicals used, companies argued, might provide 
competitors with important information about production volumes, product content, and other 
trade secrets.  A burgeoning business in “competitive intelligence” might allow companies to 
piece together data from disparate sources to create a revealing “mosaic” of facility operations.  
In contrast to the political salience of these issues, however, all disclosure programs have 
provisions for the protection of confidential business information (CBI).  Moreover, CBI claim 
rates in the Massachusetts and New Jersey programs were only around 1% to 2% of all reporting 
facilities (EPA 1995).  Although the issue of competitive intelligence is still being debated, a 
1999 GAO report found that those who practiced competitive intelligence for a living regarded Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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disclosed environmental information as of relatively low value and easily obtainable from other 
sources (GAO 1999). 
Risks of terrorism are both more alarming than those of CBI and less well-studied.  
Terrorism was the dominant concern in the RMP program, where companies and security 
agencies feared that those with ill intent anywhere in the world could anonymously access an 
Internet site and get all of the information needed to target facilities.  As the RMP program 
progressed, there were two principal studies to assess terrorism risks, one in 1997 by Aegis 
Research Corporation and another in 2000 by the Justice Department (Aegis 1997, DOJ 2000).  
Both studies concluded that RMP data would increase the likelihood of a terrorist attack.  
Although assessing the quality of these studies is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important 
to note that there were strong critiques of the Aegis study that apply to the DOJ study as well 
(Commerce Committee Democratic Staff 1999). Most significantly, the Aegis study failed to 
establish the baseline risk of an attack (since no terrorist attack on a chemical facility had 
occurred), and therefore the incremental increase from releasing OCAs couldn’t be calculated.  If 
a risk is already miniscule, doubling it is not a large concern.  Even a vice president of one of the 
firms that conducted the Aegis study argued, “the significance of relative risk, in the absence of a 
measure of absolute risk, is unknown” (Commerce Committee Democratic Staff 1999). 
The balance struck in the RMP program may have put a bump in the road for terrorists, 
but it clearly destroyed many of the disclosure benefits of the program.  Striking a more effective 
balance would have involved better identification of information that is of little use to terrorists 
while at the same time useful to a public concerned about risks.  A framework used by EPA to 
review the sensitivity of information provided on its website after September 11 provides a good 
starting point.  EPA based its assessment on four criteria: the type of information (e.g., chemical 
name or amount stored), the level of detail provided, the degree to which the data could be 
combined with other data to create complete scenarios, and EPA’s control over the release of the 
information (Stanley 2001).   More effort needs to go into operationalizing and refining these 
criteria so that agencies have an assessment mechanism they can use early on in designing 
disclosure programs. 
Conclusion 
After a few years of experience with TRI, information disclosure programs were given 
much more scrutiny by both opponents and proponents, generating the debate over the three 
programs profiled here.  September 11 has increased scrutiny again, with much more attention to Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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the potential costs as well as benefits of disclosure.  This article has discussed normative, 
substantive, and instrumental benefits of disclosure as well as collection and reporting costs, the 
costs of public reaction, and the risk of unintended use.  It has shown how different levels of 
information sharing can affect the benefit–cost calculus, and has discussed what we know and 
don’t know about the effectiveness of efforts to strike a balance between the two. 
Future information disclosure efforts at EPA and elsewhere need to be about focus and 
strategic design, with agencies deciding what goals they want information disclosure to achieve 
and tailoring programs to achieve those goals.  Thus far, information disclosure has been 
opportunity-driven, not demand-driven.  Graham’s description of the rise of disclosure systems 
generally, rings true for environmental disclosure specifically: “separate initiatives have 
percolated up through the legislative process as pragmatic approaches to diverse problems during 
a time characterized by regulatory retrenchment and frequent policy stalemate” (Graham 2002).  
Even TRI suffers from a lack of specific goals, leading the agency to do what is politically and 
bureaucratically easy (e.g., focus on only major sources) rather than what might more readily 
improve environmental quality (Pederson 2001). 
There are many possible goals agencies could pursue: improving compliance or 
encouraging firms to go beyond compliance, encouraging pollution prevention, increasing 
community understanding of risks, and many others.  Different goals will emphasize some types 
of information disclosure benefits over others, and pursuing those benefits will raise concerns 
about some information disclosure costs over others.  Balancing benefits and costs will require 
decisions about what information should be kept within firms, what should be shared with 
government, what should be communicated to local communities, and what should be made 
available to anyone with a computer and Internet connection. 
If the primary purpose of information disclosure is to enhance communities’ right to 
know, programs will have to overcome the political barriers to providing more complete risk 
information in a manner that is consistent with the best practices of risk communication and its 
sensitivity to public perceptions of risk.  Moreover, such programs will have to ensure that future 
risk communication programs are more visible and accessible to local communities than the ones 
profiled in this paper.  Doing so necessarily involves information intermediaries, such as interest 
groups and the media. 
If the primary purpose of information disclosure is substantive, then agencies have many 
more options, determined principally by who needs the data.  It is important to keep in mind, 
however, that the information is often only one of the needs for policymaking.  Particularly in Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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relation to local involvement, actual opportunities for participation—whether formalized in 
regulatory processes or reflecting collective action—are equally, if not more, important.  Future 
information dissemination programs can do a much better job of ensuring that they are relevant 
to actual opportunities for involvement in regulatory activity. 
Like substantive goals, instrumental goals may be achieved at all levels of information 
sharing.  Pressure can come from within firms, from agencies, or from external constituencies, 
such as local communities, interest groups, trade associations, or markets.  There are no 
guarantees, however, that even full-blown disclosure on the Internet will drive instrumental 
change. Although TRI can likely claim some of the large reductions in toxic emissions over the 
last decade, SFIP’s failure thus far to improve compliance is the counter-example.   
All new information disclosure policies will have to confront costs.  Least relevant for 
program design are direct collection and reporting costs, some of which will be incurred even if 
data never make it past the facility fence line.  That said, new programs may lead to widely 
different information collection and reporting costs, and a more systematic understanding of 
what drives costs is needed. 
Much more tricky are issues of public reaction to disclosed information.  Better quality 
data and more comprehensive risk information can go a long way toward correcting 
misunderstanding.  However, at the core of the policy choice between information dissemination 
and other means of regulatory control is the conflict over whether policy should be driven from 
the bottom up by community values or from the top down by agency analysis.  This is a conflict 
that has to be worked out in the political process. 
There are probably good opportunities for dealing with the unwanted use of data. CBI 
issues are largely tractable, while terrorism issues are not well-studied. Beyond the Aegis and 
DOJ studies conducted for the RMP program, much more analysis is needed.  In the absence of 
analysis, very understandable risk aversion on the part of agencies may hamper future efforts 
toward improving information disclosure programs. 
Moving forward, the era of experimentation and ad hoc disclosure policies will have to 
give way to a clearer focus on goals and a conscious effort to employ the various information-
sharing options available.  Only through a better understanding of how information disclosure 
works can we realize the power of information and make disclosure a more familiar part of the 
environmental policy mix.  Resources for the Future  Beierle 
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